When Horatio Gates assumed command of the American Army’s Northern Department during 19 August 1777, its main force had retreated to the junction of the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers, a position that could not be a fortified base for opposing John Burgoyne’s advance on Albany. Burgoyne’s army lay about 25 miles north at colonial Fort Miller, where its commander turned William Duer’s handsome home into his headquarters.
Gates knew that he had to move his troops to a position athwart Burgoyne’s invasion route. The Hudson River and the road paralleling its western shore defined that route. The first place north of Albany that met that requirement was Bemis Heights, which properly fortified would force Burgoyne to act on American terms. The Americans occupied that height during 13 September, erected batteries at its base, interdicting the river and the road, constructed a line of field fortifications on the military crest of the bluffs overlooking the valley, and extended those fortifications westward to beyond the first road paralleling the Albany Road.
Burgoyne had to lure or drive the Americans off Bemis Heights. His only alternative was to abort his advance or try to retreat northward to Ticonderoga, which with Gates’ larger force south of him and Americans under Benjamin Lincoln’s direction east of the river and between Saratoga and Ft Edward, would convert a retreat into a death march. Even if his men survived to reach Ticonderoga, a northern winter there would be worse than trying American courage and arms at Bemis Heights. Gates had dictated the strategic terms.
Friday, February 5, 2010
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