General Burgoyne’s men won a tactical victory on 19 September, but the Americans retained the strategic advantage. They continued to interdict the route to Albany by remaining on Bemis Heights. Cold nights and frosty mornings foretold the coming of winter and an end to the campaigning season.
Burgoyne had to devise a tactical solution. All Gates had to do was retain his position. Burgoyne’s men went on reduced rations on 3 October. Burgoyne called a council on the fourth and proposed leaving 800 men to guard supplies and committed the rest to attack Gates’ left and rear. His shocked subordinates objected that such a flanking move would take so much time that the Americans could overwhelm the 800-man guard and repulse the flanking action. The council adjourned without a decision.
During the next day, von Riedesel proposed withdrawing to the mouth of the Battenkill, await word from Sir Henry Clinton, and be in position to retreat northward. Burgoyne rejected that proposal as surrendering the initiative to the Americans and quaranteeing turning retrograde move into a death march. He revived his 4 October proposal in a radically different form. He would organize a reconnaissance in force to probe the American left. If the probe found conditions favorable, he would launch an all-out attack during next day. If conditions were unfavorable, he would withdraw to the Battenkill during 11 October. This was the genesis of the battle of 7 October—the campaign’s final and definitive engagement. Tune in next week for a study of that decisive event.
Thursday, March 25, 2010
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